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Abstract. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards designed to deter nuclear 
proliferation are constantly evolving to respond to new challenges. Within its State Level Concept, the 
IAEA envisions an objective-based and information-driven approach for designing and implementing 
State Level Approaches (SLAs), using all available measures to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of safeguards. The main objectives of a SLA are a) to detect undeclared nuclear material or 
activities in the State, b) to detect undeclared production or processing of nuclear materials in declared 
facilities or locations outside facilities (LOFs), c) to detect diversion of declared nuclear material in 
declared facilities or LOFs. Under the SLA, States will be differentiated based upon objective State-
Specific Factors that influence the design, planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities. 
Proposed categories of factors include both technical and legal aspects, spanning from the deployed 
fuel cycle and the related state’s  technical capability to the type of safeguards agreements in force and 
the IAEA experience in implementing safeguards in that state. To design a SLA, the IAEA foresees 
the use of Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) to identify the plausible routes for acquiring weapons-
usable material and to assess their safeguards significance. In order to achieve this goal, APA will 
have to identify possible acquisition paths, characterize them and eventually prioritise them. This 
paper will  provide an overview of how the use of open source information (here loosely defined as 
any type of non-classified or proprietary information and including, but not limited to, media sources, 
government and non-governmental reports and analyses, commercial data, satellite imagery, 
scientific/technical literature, trade data) can support this activity in selected aspects of a typical APA 
approach. 
1. The Context 
1.1. Acquisition Path Analysis within the IAEA State Level Concept 
The IAEA’s State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to nuclear safeguards considering the 
State as a whole greater than the mere sum of its nuclear-related installations. According to guidance 
issued by the IAEA, it “applies to all States and involves a comprehensive State evaluation and State-
level safeguards approach, including the identification of specific safeguards measures for each State, 
implemented through an annual implementation plan.”[1] 
 
The State Level Approach (SLA) for safeguards implementation is defined by the IAEA Safeguards 
Glossary  as “a safeguards approach […] developed for a specific State, encompassing all nuclear 
material, nuclear installations and nuclear fuel cycle related activities in that State. A State level 
safeguards approach defines the application of safeguards measures at each facility and location 
outside facilities in the State and, where an additional protocol is in force, the safeguards measures 
[…] that would enable the IAEA to draw and maintain a conclusion of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in that State”.[2] 
 
The SLA is designed to achieve the following state-level safeguards objectives: [3] 
 
A.  Detection of any undeclared nuclear materials and activities 
B.   Detection of any misuse of declared facilities for undeclared nuclear material production or 
processing 
C.  Detection of any diversion of declared nuclear material 
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Objective A deals with undeclared activities in undeclared sites, i.e. completely clandestine activities. 
Objective B deals with undeclared activities in declared facilities, i.e. usually referred to as misuse. 
Objective C deals with diversion of declared nuclear material from declared facilities. Objective B and 
C are usually covered by traditional safeguards inspections. Objective A is usually much more 
complicated to cover and, according to the IAEA, cannot be properly addressed without an Additional 
Protocol in force.  
 
In the State Level Approach, the IAEA makes use of Acquisition Path Analysis (APA).[3] The APA is 
defined as “the analysis of all plausible acquisition paths or acquisition strategies for a State to 
acquire nuclear material usable for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.”[2] Acquisition 
paths are considered to be technically plausible if the State could, “from a technical point of view, 
acquire at least one significant quantity of weapons-usable material within five years”. All technically 
plausible acquisition paths will have to be covered in the State-Level Approach.[4] 
 
The identification of plausible acquisition paths is supported by the IAEA’s Physical Model, a 
collection of documents where a comprehensive set of technological acquisition paths are discussed in 
terms of the technologies and materials involved and the indicators of their presence within a State. 
These indicators can either be strong (presence of an indicator is necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a given safeguards-relevant activity), medium (presence of an indicator is necessary but 
not sufficient for the existence of a given safeguards-relevant activity) or weak (presence of an 
indicator may be connected to the presence of a given safeguards-relevant activity but is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to determine its existence).[5]  
 
Acquisition paths are characterized in terms of the ease and speed by which a State could acquire one 
significant quantity of nuclear material.[4] These factors will influence the type, intensity and 
frequency of safeguards measures in the design of a state-level safeguards approach for a particular 
State. 
 
1.2. Open source information and NPT compliance analysis 
Within a systems approach, open source analysis could be described as “getting the right information 
(what) to the right people (who) at the right time (when) for the right purpose (why) in the right forum 
(where) and in the right way (how)” [6] by merging openly available data and information coming 
from a wide variety of accessible sources into a cohesive picture. It often requires the collection, 
filtering and handling of a large amount of data, a small fraction of which is really useful. It is 
therefore a situation in which the two problems of too much (mostly irrelevant) data and too few 
(useful) data coexist. 
 
Although there is no universally codified definition of open source information, the U.S. Intelligence 
community defined it as “publicly available information that anyone can lawfully obtain by request, 
purchase, or observation”.[7] The IAEA considers the term “open source information” to include – 
but not limited to – “information generally available from external sources, such as scientific 
literature, official information, information issued by public organizations, commercial companies 
and the news media, and commercial satellite imagery”.[8] There are several discussions on open 
sources to be considered in a non-proliferation framework.[9], [10]
 
While sources of open source 
information are too numerous to discuss in detail (e.g. social media, news media, journals, virtual 
globes, etc.)[11], there are four principal open source analytical areas that can support the APA: 
 
 Technical/official information analysis: scientific literature, official information, information 
issued by public organizations, commercial companies [12]  
 Media monitoring: news, blogs, social networks [13], [14] 
 Imagery analysis: commercial satellite imagery, ground-level imagery [15] 
 Import/export analysis: trade data [16], [17], [18], [19], legal/illicit procurement information  
 
While the IAEA makes use of all information at its disposal (including inter alia, official declarations 
by the State, information collected during safeguards verification activities, third-party information, 
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and open source information) [8], [20], this discussion focuses on the contribution of open source and 
the informational and analytical uncertainties involved when supporting the APA. As discussed below, 
these sources support the APA to varying degrees when monitoring suspect sites, verifying design 
information, assessing technical capabilities, and searching for indications of undeclared activities and 
imports. 
2. Open source analysis in support of Acquisition Path Analysis 
The stages of an APA identified by the IAEA are: [4] 
 
1. “Consolidating information about a State’s past, present, and planned nuclear fuel cycle-
related capabilities and infrastructure 
2. Identifying and visually presenting technically plausible acquisition paths 
3. Assessing a State’s technical capabilities and possible actions to conduct each step of the 
technically plausible paths  
4. Assessing the time needed to complete a technically plausible acquisition path”  
 
In the following paragraphs, the potential contributions of open source analysis to the four stages of 
the APA are described, along with potential informational and analytical uncertainties. 
 
2.1. Consolidating information about a State’s past, present, and planned nuclear fuel cycle-
related capabilities and infrastructure 
The first stage of the APA process collects and consolidates information on a state’s past, present, and 
planned nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and infrastructure.[4] When evaluating a state’s capabilities, 
specific analytical questions are posed according to the type of pathway (e.g. types and locations of 
materials for a diversion scenario). This information is then utilized when estimating the time required 
for a state to complete the path. Table 1 maps the possible use of open source analysis when 
evaluating a state’s past, present, and planned nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and infrastructure. The 
first two columns list the areas of information needed to “prepare for conducting in-depth acquisition 
path analysis”,[4] the third column indicates the potential role of open source analysis, and the 
remaining columns indicate where open sources can contribute.   
Table 1.Potential roles for open source analyses in supporting the consolidation of information about 
a State’s past, present, and planned nuclear fuel cycle-related capabilities and infrastructure. 
Information Collection Areas 
[4] 
Potential Role of Open Source Analysis 
Technical/ 
Official 
Information 
Analysis 
Media 
Monitoring 
Imagery 
Analysis 
Import/ 
Export 
Analysis 
Present 
nuclear 
fuel 
cycle 
Declared facilities, 
LOFs, and sites 
CSA-only: Corroboration of state 
declarations (facilities, LOFs) 
CSA+AP: Corroboration of state declarations 
(sites) 
Y Y Y - 
Exports and imports 
of nuclear material 
Corroboration of state declarations Y Y - Y 
Nuclear fuel cycle 
related R&D 
CSA-only: main source of information 
CSA+AP: corroboration of state declarations 
Y Y - Y 
Exports and imports 
of equipment and 
non-nuclear material 
CSA-only: main source of information 
CSA+AP: corroboration of state declarations 
Y Y - Y 
Uranium mines and 
concentration plants 
CSA-only: main source of information 
CSA+AP: corroboration of state declarations 
Y Y Y Y 
Pre-34(c) material 
holders 
CSA-only: main source of information 
CSA+AP: corroboration of state declarations 
Y Y - Y 
Past nuclear fuel cycle activities Corroboration of initial declaration Y Y Y Y 
Planned nuclear fuel cycle 
activities 
Indications of plans to acquire capabilities  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Identified anomalies Indication and investigation of anomalies Y Y Y Y 
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2.2. Identification of technically plausible acquisition paths 
As defined by the IAEA, a path is considered technically plausible if the State could, “from a technical 
point of view, acquire at least one significant quantity of weapons-usable material within five 
years”.[4] Therefore, technical plausibility is a matter of knowing what is technologically feasible, the 
identification of a state’s strategies (e.g. indigenous production, diversion, misuse, clandestine, 
import), and a preliminary assessment of the time necessary to complete the path based on the intrinsic 
difficulty of the path and the state’s capabilities to complete the path.  
 
Open source plays a limited role in identifying technically feasible pathways, but are utilized when 
assessing technically plausibility. Feasibility and plausibility differ in that feasibility reflects 
technological possibilities (i.e. the production possibility set [21]) irrespective of a state’s capability to 
pursue the path. The process of identifying feasible path steps begins with declared facilities followed 
by the addition of processes that are necessary to complete an acquisition pathway. There are five 
types of path steps by which nuclear material could be obtained [4]: 
 
 Indigenous production of pre-34(c) nuclear material (nuclear material containing uranium or 
thorium that has not reached the composition or purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being 
isotopically enriched) 
 Diversion of declared nuclear material in declared facilities or locations outside facilities 
(LOFs), including nuclear material in transit (shipment/receipts) 
 Undeclared production or processing of nuclear material in declared facilities or LOFs (i.e. 
misuse)  
 Undeclared production or processing of nuclear material in undeclared facilities (i.e. 
clandestine) 
 Undeclared import of nuclear material (i.e. import)  
The process of feasible path identification appears to be well developed, leveraging a State’s 
declarations and the IAEA’s Physical Model [5] to identify technically feasible pathways for the 
production of nuclear material usable in a nuclear explosive. 
 
Open source analyses play a role when evaluating the plausibility of a path step. A path is considered 
technically plausible if its use by a state within a defined set of time cannot be excluded. Therefore, 
technical plausibility is a preliminary assessment of the time necessary to complete the path based on 
the intrinsic difficulty of the path and the state’s capabilities to complete the path. At this stage of the 
APA, technical plausibility acts as a screening criterion to limit the scope of analysis, excluding 
options judged to be too far off into the future to warrant further analysis. As technical plausibility is a 
question of path completion time, the role of open source in assessing intrinsic difficulty and 
capability to support estimates of time is discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.3. Technical capability to accomplish each path step and the identification of State actions 
Assessments of the technical capability of the state draw upon specific types of information from the 
consolidated information about a state. Relevant technical details of a state’s capabilities depend on 
the type of acquisition path (indigenous production, diversion, misuse, clandestine, import). As 
discussed in this section, the role of open sources (summarized in Table 2) and the associated 
informational uncertainties vary amongst these five types of path steps. 
Table 2. Illustrative roles of open source information and analysis in support of acquisition path steps 
assessment. 
Acquisition Path Step Type [4] 
Technical/Official 
Information Analysis 
Media 
Monitoring 
Imagery 
Analysis 
Import/Export 
Analysis 
Indigenous production of pre-34(c) 
U/Th deposits,  
production activities/ 
capabilities 
Current and 
planned 
activities 
Monitoring 
of sites 
Import/export of 
material and 
equipment 
Diversion of declared nuclear material in 
declared facilities or locations outside facilities 
(LOFs), including nuclear material in transit 
(shipment/receipts) 
- 
Third-party 
information* 
- - 
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Acquisition Path Step Type [4] 
Technical/Official 
Information Analysis 
Media 
Monitoring 
Imagery 
Analysis 
Import/Export 
Analysis 
Undeclared production or processing of nuclear 
material in declared facilities or LOFs 
Technical capability to 
modify facilities and 
handle material 
Third-party 
information* 
- 
Import/export of 
material and 
equipment 
Undeclared production or processing of nuclear 
material in undeclared facilities 
Knowledge and 
infrastructure 
Third-party 
information* 
Investigation 
of possible 
sites 
Import/export of 
material and 
equipment 
Undeclared import of nuclear material Indications of import 
Third-party 
information* 
- 
Import/export of 
material and 
equipment 
* Examples of third party information include national intelligence agencies, non-governmental organizations, dissident groups, 
whistle-blowers, etc.  
 
Assessing the indigenous production of pre-34(c) material requires characterizing actual and 
potential uranium and thorium deposits (location, operational status, size, grade, etc.) and the 
capability of the state to extract those resources.  For states party to the Additional Protocol, declared 
sources and capabilities are well described in state declarations and open sources of information could 
be used to corroborate those declarations. For states not party to the Additional Protocol, literature on 
indigenous production activities and capabilities (such as the OECD “Redbook”[22]) could be utilized 
to characterize the resource base and potential ore locations. Additional information may be in the 
grey literature or proprietary in the case of the exploration activities of private companies. Commercial 
satellite imagery could systematically monitor these locations for signs of indigenous production and 
trade data could be collected to identify imports of material and equipment.  
 
In the case of diversion, open sources are unlikely to play a leading role as verified stated declarations 
are by far the most valuable source of information. Relevant technical information on material 
quantities and properties, and the design of facilities are available to the agency for the purposes of 
developing a safeguards approach. Information related to a state’s capabilities to divert material are 
relatively unimportant as managing the time, distance, and shielding issues associated with moving 
material are well within reach of most states involved in nuclear activities and are often legitimately 
pursued for the safe operation of a facility. Nevertheless, open sources may be useful in corroborating 
state declarations and planning safeguards activities (e.g. verification of site layouts via satellite 
imagery). 
 
Similarly, misuse of declared facilities will largely rely upon verified state declarations of materials 
and facilities for assessing the time and effort required for producing or processing undeclared 
materials using declared facilities. Open sources can be useful for evaluating a state’s capability to 
make process modifications or handle certain types of material should the misuse scenario require 
such capabilities.  Such information could be obtained from known declared capabilities (e.g. the State 
is a technology owner in that nuclear process or a technology user) and from reviews of technical 
literature. The availability and reliability of information on a State’s capabilities, however, is 
diminished if states control publication or rely upon well documented processes implemented by 
industrial personnel with little incentive to publish openly.[23]  
 
In the case of undeclared activities (including import), analysts require information on the 
knowledge and infrastructure available to a state to pursue clandestine activities. Open sources play a 
greater role when evaluating the potential for clandestine path steps and clandestine imports of 
material and equipment, but may be the least reliable. Evaluations of technical/official literature and 
trade could reveal information on the knowledge and R&D activities of state, a state’s equipment 
manufacturing or purchasing activities, the availability of equipment within the state, and experience 
with operating related processes. Imagery could also monitor locations where clandestine activities are 
suspected. However, some facilities such as a “quick and dirty” reprocessing facility or a small 
enrichment plant may be very difficult to observe, particularly before they are operational.[24], [25], 
[26] Moreover, information may be incomplete, unreliable, ambiguous, and even deceptive, 
particularly if the State denies/suppresses signatures and/or engages in deception. Table 3 presents 
denial and deception methods that can contribute to informational uncertainties about a state’s 
capabilities. 
 
6 
Table 3. Denial and deception methods contribute to informational uncertainties. Table adapted from 
chemical and biological weapon program signatures and concealment actions. [23] 
Open Source 
Detection Methods 
Signatures Sought Denial and Deception Methods 
Technical/ official 
information analysis 
& media monitoring 
Research and development activities 
Manage publication activities 
Use widely available technical information 
Alternative or modified processes 
Claim legitimate applications 
Cover stories 
Effluents (e.g. environmental monitoring, 
public health records) 
Suppress effluents 
Suppress reporting 
Imagery analysis 
Security features Conceal or place within other secure facilities 
Functional and operational design features Mask true use through signature suppression 
Import/ Export 
analysis 
Patterns of material acquisition 
Special equipment acquisition 
Imports of dual-use equipment 
Shuffle, divert acquisitions 
Obtain from multiple suppliers/intermediaries 
Mix with legitimate uses 
Develop clandestine networks 
Produce indigenously 
Divert equipment from legitimate activities 
Alternative processes 
Claim legitimate uses 
 
2.4. Open source in support of the assessment of the path completion time 
Estimating the time needed to complete an acquisition path is the most analytically challenging aspect 
of the APA process. Estimating the time necessary for a state to complete a pathway involves 
comparing the intrinsic difficulty of the path steps to the capability of the state to carry out the path 
step. To draw an analogy, much as the apparent ease and grace of a professional ballerina belies the 
difficulty of ballet, the concepts of ease and speed reflect a combination of the intrinsic difficulty of 
the task and the capabilities of the performer. Therefore, pathway completion time is a relative 
measure – what is easy and fast for some may be difficult and slow for others. Estimating how fast or 
how slow, however, must contend with sources of analytical uncertainty in estimates of intrinsic 
difficulty and time. 
 
Though much of the necessary information has been collected by this stage, open source can play an 
additional role when evaluating intrinsic difficulty by making use of existing evaluations. For 
example, several studies have reported on the infrastructure requirements for a clandestine 
reprocessing facility.[25], [26] Another study catalogued timelines for nuclear fuel cycle technology 
research and development efforts by States.[27] Caution is necessary when evaluating these studies as 
qualitative statements can be misleading. For example, some studies state that “… all enrichment 
techniques demand sophisticated technology in large and expensive facilities”, suggesting that 
enrichment is out of reach of all but the most capable states. In contrast, other studies suggest that “… 
it [is] feasible for countries with no prior experience, ‘that possess relatively little technical skills and 
which have relatively little industrial activity,’ to produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons by 
means of a small centrifuge plant.”[28]  
 
Once a task has been defined in sufficient detail, engineering management methods could be used to 
estimate the time necessary to complete a task in light of a state’s capabilities and resources. As noted 
by the developers of the Program Evaluation Research Task process for project management, “The 
status of a developmental program at any given time is a function of several variables: resources, in 
the form of dollars, or what 'dollars' represent-manpower, materials, and methods of production, 
technical performance of systems, subsystems, and components, and time.”[29] These types of 
engineering assessments can serve as a means allocating safeguards resources by identifying processes 
whose disruption would delay progress towards weapons-usable nuclear material.[30]  
 
The certainty to which engineering assessments can estimate ease and speed varies with the type of 
pathway under consideration. Even assuming certain input data, the certainty of the output depends in 
part upon the degree to which factors of production are fixed or variable in an assessment. In the 
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parlance of production economics, factors of production (e.g. land, labor, capital equipment) are fixed 
and not readily altered over the short-run. In the long-run, all factors of production are variable.[31] 
 
Assessments of diversion and misuse path steps are more certain as factors of production are largely 
fixed. In the case of diversion, assessments of diversion path steps will mainly rely on State 
declarations. The need to understand a state’s technical capability to divert material is relatively 
limited to whether or not a State has the capability to manage the time, distance, and shielding issues 
of moving material and perhaps understanding safeguards methodologies if detection is a concern – 
but these capabilities are well within reach of virtually all states involved with nuclear technology.  
 
Misuse path steps are somewhat more complicated than diversion as factors of production are more 
variable and a state’s capabilities are more salient, leading to greater analytical uncertainties. Though 
there are more variable factors, including the possible use of indigenously produced or imported 
feed material, existing facilities impose constraints on modifications that are implementable in the 
short-run e.g. using excess capacity or modifying existing equipment. Understanding a state’s 
technical capabilities are of greater relevance than in the case of diversion as not all states may not be 
as equally capable of modifying facilities or handling different chemical forms – a State that is a 
technology owner will likely be more capable than a technology user.  
 
As with misuse path steps, open sources are highly relevant to evaluating a state’s technical capability 
to pursue clandestine pathways. However, there are considerably more degrees of freedom when 
assessing clandestine path steps that include the possibility of indigenously produced material and 
imported material and equipment, creating considerable uncertainties in the analytical process. 
Factors of production are variable in the long-run and assessments must evaluate the complex 
relationship between time, resources, and capability.[29] The resulting analytical uncertainties can be 
significant. For instance, a project that would have taken nearly two decades in peacetime was 
substantially accelerated to less than half that time during wartime by performing steps more quickly 
and in parallel.[32] Moreover, this was achieved over half a century ago during the Manhattan Project 
when very little was known of the basic physics and engineering challenges that are now well 
known.[33] 
 
As noted by a recent study on latency, “if one uses [an engineering management] approach for specific 
known cases, the time predicted for a state to develop its first nuclear device tends to be incorrect” as 
“… pathway decisions are determined by various motivations and institutional impediments that often 
outweigh the pure engineering resource management decisions.”[34] An academic study on US 
intelligence estimates of foreign nuclear programmes [35] suggests that underestimates of a state’s 
nuclear capabilities can be comparable to the five year criterion used to judge technical plausibility. In 
other words, a capability judged to be five years away may exist in a state.
 
Although the study refers to 
all-source assessments, there is no reason to think that the same does not apply to open source 
analyses. 
3. Summary and Discussion 
As presented in this paper, open source information collection and analysis can play a role in 
supporting the acquisition path analysis process. In particular, it can support/complement/inform the 
analysts on the technical capability of a State to set up and operate a given nuclear process in a given 
time frame. As summarized in Table 4, open sources play varying roles in an APA. While playing a 
limited role when evaluating diversion path steps, open sources may be the only source of information 
available to the IAEA when evaluating a state’s capability to misuse declared facilities and pursue 
undeclared path steps. However, analysts must contend with two sources of uncertainties: 
informational and analytical. Information collected in the open source must be treated as potentially 
incomplete, unreliable, ambiguous, and deceptive. Moreover, the analytical processes can propagate 
these informational uncertainties to produce unreliable results. Historical evidence suggests that these 
errors may be large enough such that path steps judged to be implausible within the next five years 
may already exist within the State. 
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Table 4. APA information requirements, potential roles of open source, information uncertainties, and 
analytical uncertainties 
Stage Sub-Stage Role of Open Source 
Information 
Uncertainties 
Analytical Uncertainties 
Information 
collection 
 
Contributes to all-source 
information collection 
- - 
Path 
identification 
Declared path steps Corroboration of declarations - - 
Addition of feasible 
path steps 
N/A 
(Physical Model identifies 
technological possibilities) 
- - 
 
Identification of 
plausible path steps 
See technical capability - - 
Technical 
capability 
Indigenous 
production of pre-
34(c) path steps 
CSA-only states: main source of 
information 
CSA+AP: corroboration of state 
declarations 
CSA-only: possibly 
unreliable and incomplete 
CSA+AP: not all 
activities may be declared 
- 
Diversion path steps 
State declarations are paramount, 
OS plays corroborating role 
- 
Mostly fixed production 
factors 
Misuse path steps 
Informs assessment of capability to 
modify/exploit existing equipment 
Denial and deception 
Fixed and variable 
production factors 
Clandestine path 
steps and import 
Informs assessment of state’s 
capability 
Denial and deception 
Variable production 
factors 
Estimating 
time 
- 
Informs assessment of the intrinsic 
difficulty of a step 
Potentially misleading 
qualitative statements 
Errors may be comparable 
to technical plausibility 
criterion 
 
3.1. Some methodological considerations 
Information coming from safeguards activities, including open source information can be considered 
being pieces of empirical evidence.[36], [37] Their use and their dependability will depend on both the 
framework in which they are used and on the nature of the piece of evidence.  
 
It is possible to identify three main broad conditions in which a State could fall with respect of its 
technical capability to perform a given process: 
 
1. The State has the necessary infrastructure in place to perform the process; 
2. The State is capable of setting up the necessary infrastructure to perform the process; 
3. The State can become capable of setting up the necessary infrastructure to perform the process. 
 
In principle, the first condition can be demonstrated true. Depending on the process and safeguards 
framework, this might be either trivial (e.g. evidence of research and development activities related to 
the nuclear fuel cycle that do not make use of nuclear material in a CSA-only safeguards framework – 
the activities do not need to be declared by the State but, being fully licit, evidence of their existence is 
very easy to find) or close to being practically impossible (e.g. a clandestine processing activity at lab-
scale). Indeed, many of the techniques to detect such infrastructure, when clandestine, are vulnerable 
to denial and deception efforts as outlined in Table 3. “The difference between intelligence and 
scientific research is that intelligence deals with a consciously deceptive adversary.” [38]  
 
Conditions number 2 and 3 would always require a degree of judgment due to the time limit imposed 
by the definition of technical plausibility. Past examples like the British Blue Streak programme [39] 
indicate how uncertain the process of mastering new hard technologies might be, even for advanced 
States with highly developed soft skills. Any type of empirical evidence connected to these conditions 
would have an informative power at most, and sound management of these uncertainties is required. 
 
Outside an empirical science framework, the gathering of empirical evidence can still be very 
important and valuable, but the analysts making use of it should be aware that their ability to falsify or 
corroborate a statement has probably decayed and replaced by a much weaker ability to inform or 
support a hypothesis rather than unequivocally demonstrating truth. In other words, outside an 
empirical science framework empirical evidence can at most support a statement with a given 
likelihood, i.e. testing the truth of a statement instead of demonstrating it logically. 
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4. Conclusions 
The IAEA State Level Concepts foresees the use of Acquisition Path Analysis to design a State-Level 
Approach for safeguards implementation. This paper reflects on the potential roles of open source 
information in the acquisition paths analysis process. Depending on the acquisition path analysis stage, 
the role of open source information could vary from corroboration of already known information 
(correctness of declarations) to the identification of potential undeclared nuclear activities 
(completeness of declarations). The nature of the evidence obtainable from open sources requires 
careful management of all potential sources of uncertainty, both informational and analytical. 
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